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HARRISON TO ARMSTRONG

No 47 Head Quarters

Cincinnati 27th March 1813.

Sir

I had the honour to receive your favor of the 7th Inst on Tuesday last and should have received it by the return of the mail but was misinformed as to the time of its departure -- those of the 15th & 17th. arrived last Evg.

Had your letter of the 5th been received before the Measures for bringing out the Militia which I had requested from the state of Kentucky had progressed so far that the day of Gnl. Rendezvous had been appointed & the men left their homes I should have requested Genl. Shelby to counter- mand the order for calling them out -- the militia which have been em- bodied from this state from my last requisition not sufficient to join on the small posts-- One of the divisions furnished 40 instead of 250 men [In the margin[] Altho I am well convinced that if they are delayed four weeks we shall I [illeg.] have a part retaining upon this frontier

In your letter of the 5th. Inst. I am authorized to maintain or abandon the post at the Rapids of Miami as the one or the other may appear most proper under the circumstances which you mention. It could not be abandoned without sacrificing the artillery & valuable stores which are there & which no [illeg.] a means that I know of could bring off through the swamps that Furrow that place at this season to attempts to bring them up the Miami & Auglaize Rivers would from the length of time that it would be to the expense the detachment which would exert it to circulate distinction -- I had therefore no alternative but to main- tain the post -- It is safe from the attempts of the enemy until lake Erie is navigable and as long as the Virginia & Pennsylva Brigades of Militia remain there

On the 2nd proximo however the last of these Troops will be dis- charged -- It if is not then strongly reinforced it will be in Consider- able danger. A smaller work would have been more defencible But I must Confess that the Idea never occured to me that the Government would be unwitting to Keep in the field at least the semblance of an army of militia until the Regular Troops could be raised. A regular strong work calculated for 3 or 400 men could have been erected but with that force only at the rapids there could be no possible impediment to the enemy in taking all the [illeg.] all forst excepting the swamps which surround those of McArthur [illeg.] & [illeg.] There are 300 Indian Warriors in the neighbourhood of Upper Sandusky -- (Wyandots & a Mixture of Delawares & Munsies) the firendship towards us is by no means unequivocal An army of ours in their front will ensure their neutrality but that army dis- missed and a British and Indian Force appearing amongst them nine tenths of those warriors would immediately[?] join them -- The posts of upper & lower Sandusky would fall & the whole frontier as far back as Delaware at last would be stript of its Inhabitants. Further west in the immediate vicinity of fort McArthur where we retain a large deposit of stores, there are about two Hundred Shawanoes & a number of Iroquois -- their friendship for us is never to be depended upon -- But should the enemy appear in force a great part of the young men would certainly join them -- Fort McArthur has not a man to defend it -- Genl Meigs sent there two Compys called out for 30 days & they abandoned it at the expiration of that time Still further West upon the Head of the Auglaize River is the large Shawanoe village of Wapoch Konnata the Chiefs of which are altogether in our interest & may be relyed upon [illeg -- never?] -- But the warriors like all others of their discipline might be easily sundered[?] -- Near to the village of Piqua the Delawares to the amount of Nine Hundred souls & upwards of 200 warriors are encamped-- Their chiefs are now of Principle but the greater part of their warriors are attached to the enemy & would join them when ever an opportunity offered -- the dis- affected can at any time they please Communicate with the hostile Indians the posts of Wapock Konnata, Loramies St Mary's Amanda -- Jennings Brown & Winchester (Consisting of block houses Connected by pickets & having the immence supply of provisions Contained in the enclos- ed schedule) are immediately in the front of those people -- Until the arrival of the nearly drafted Militia from this state the force for the defence of all these posts consisted of 18 invalid Regulars & a weak & [illeg.] Compy of Dismounted Rangers -- As soon as Lake Erie is navi- gable the enemy could in Six Hours reach the foot of the Miami Rapids or Sandusky Bay with all their disposable force & with any quantity of artillery which they chose to bring -- Admitting that the Post at the rapids could not have beentaken but what [illeg.] with no greater natural advantages than that Infantry could long resist a superior force with the immence batterys train of battery pf artillery which the enemy could with such facility bring to bear upon it -- without an army there capable of opposing the enemy in the field nothing could prevent them from taking all our posts in the rear -- and I have stated that they would find friends there willing to assist them in all their enterprises -- It may be objected that the retaining the post at the Rapids was injudicious I answer that at the time it was occupied I had the strongest hopes of being enabled to advance against Malden -- & having gotten on there the Artillery & stores when the ground was frozen they could not have been taken back. But these were [illeg.] the Considerations which determined not to retain that position. It is only necessary to mention one of them -- the greater part of the supplies for the operation of the ensuing summer were placed upon the Auglaize & St Marys -- these Rivers are navigable in the spring only -- at that season they could be transported in boats to the rapids for one twentieth part of the Expense which it would cost to take them by land -- should the Rapids be abandoned they could not be reoccupied until the season for navigation [illeg.] would have passed. With this view of the subject I could not hesitate as I Conceived that I possessed the Presidents Authority for doing it to call for a sufficient number of Militia to ensure an effective force at the Rapids of from 1500 to 2000 and I regret that I have not the power of calling for as many more-- [illeg.] effectually to Cover Fort Wayne & the other posts in that direction -- For the force I entertain great appre- hensions -- In a letter addressed to Colo Morrison in Jany last I ex- plained the facility with which an attack upon those places may be made from Chicago -- I did not believe however that there would be much danger until Lake Michigan was navigable -- but if the information received by Genl Shelby[?] is correct it may be invested much earlier -- I have with the army two Captns of Engineers one of the Captns Gratiot has been ill for many weeks. Captn Wood was sent to improve the work at Lower Sand- usky -- I shall order him immediately to Fort Wayne for the same purpose--

85, 86