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HARRISON TO MONROE

No 31 Head Quarters N.W Army

Franklinton 6th Jany 1813.

Sir

Since I had the honor to write to you yesterday I have had a con- versations with the Deputy Quarter Master General Colonel Morrison He is decidedly of opinion that the means of transportation now in his poss- ession will enable him to supply the army with provision & to take on the Artillery & stores necessary for the operations against Malden unless the winter should be uncommonly open But At this Moment the appearances in relation to the weather are extremely unfavorable. Our preparations are however so well advanced that we shall be able to take advantage of a change which the season authorises as to expect and with 3 weeks of severe frosts to make a Deposit of provisions at the Rapids of Miami sufficient to authorise the advance of the army from that point. If our expectations on this subject are disappointed longer perseverance in attempting to reach the principal object of our wishes (the reduction of Malden) during the winter will as you observe conserve [?] our provisions in resources in vain efforts And however reluctant I may be to abandon hopes which have been formed as well upon the confidence I have in the troops I Command as the state of our actual preparations I will submit to the hard necessity and direct my thoughts towards an economical dis- position of the troops for the Winter and an arrangement of supplies cal- culated for early & vigorous operations of this army for the Winter with- out having accomplished the principal object for which it was embodied is an event which has been looked for by most of the well informed men who knew the Character of the country & recollected that the army of Genl Wayne after a whole summer preparation was unable to advance more than 70 miles from the Ohio & [illeg.] that the prudent Caution of Genl Washington had directed it to be placed in winter quarters at the very season that our arrangements were commenced. You do me Justice in beliving that my exertions have been unremitted and I am as yet sencislbe of the Commission of our error only that has injuriously effected our interests & that is the retaining of too large a force at Defiance -- the disadvantage attend- ing it were however seen at the period of my Committing the management of that wing to Genl Winchester possessing a superior rank in the line of the army to that which was tendered to me I considered him rather in the light of an associate in Commd. than an inferior I therefore re- commended to him instead of ordering it to send back two Rgts within the bound of our[?] contract -- Had this measure been pursued there would have been at Fort Winchester (Defiance) 100,000 Rations More than there is at present -- The General who possesses the most estimable qualities of the head & heart was deceived as I was with regard to the period when the army could advance & he did not thinly that the reduction of isues would be so important as it is now ascertained they would have been

As the greater part of the expenses of the Campaign have been al- ready incurred I beg leave to assure you sir that trifling difficulties will not oppose the progress of the army to Malden -- but at the same time I also promise you that no measure shall be ordered[?] when the pro- spects of success are not as clear as they can be in any military oper- ations. I know not what measures can be adopted to make a [illeg. ] in our favor or to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to Malden from Erie & Fort George -- After what has happened at Niagara & it has been published to the world that the Militia in that quarter would not cross the line the British will certainly view as a feint & not [illeg.] any movements of the Regular troops then of whose numbers they must be well informed. With such a force as I can select from this Army however provided I can find the means of transporting there the provisions & the artilery I should not fear to encounter the force which they now have in the Upper District when reinforced by that which they dare spare from below --

That I may be better understood & that you may be enabled to correct the errors of my opinions & [illeg.] I will now state as briefly as possible what appears to me to be the advantages & disadvantages which will attend an attack upon Malden in the three modes by which only it can be approahced --

The first is that which is now in Contemplation of advancing in the midst of winter & crossing the straight upon the ice -- The objections on that in an enterprise of this kind in a climate so rigorous the troops would suffer greatly -- that [illeg.] to subordination it might be imposs- ible to make them bear such hardships -- that in some winters the ice is not sufficiently strong to bear an army & artillery & that some times when it is so a warm days may [?] suddenly open the straight & thereby prevent our passage after we shall have arrived under [illeg.] which [illeg.] our or that having passed the communication with the rear may be cut off it thus making it necessary to [illeg.] the Army & every thing which it may require in a siege at the same time a circumstance which it may not be in our power to effect -- that the operations of a seige in Winter are very difficult & that in case of any disaster the retreat of the army might be inpracticable even the uncertainty of the Continuance of the ice as above stated -- The advantages of this plan of attack are -- that the road being frozen are passable for artillery & baggage notwithstanding the swampy nature of the Country -- that qith the lighter sleds the men might draw thei own baggage upon the ice-- that the principal object of the Campaign could be accomplished sooner & consequently with less expense than waiting until spring & that whatevermight be the case with the regular & militia force of the enemy we should certainly have fewer Indians to contend with The 2nd plan is that of marching to Detroit at any time when the pre- parations can be made -- building a sufficiency of boats & passing the Army over in that Manner -- there are no peculiar advantages attending this mode of proceding and the disadvantages are numberous -- the would require a much longer time to effect it & Consequently much more provisions & a much greater number of men-- As each Convoy must have an escort capable of Contending at best with the whole of the Indian force of the enemy --

The third plan is that of erecting a naval force capable of Command- ing the lake & with it to transport as soon as the navigation opens the army artillery & baggage to some point on the North shore below Malden & from thence to Commence operations against Malden & Detroit -- I have no means of estimating correctly the cost of a naval [illeg.] capable of effecting this object but from my knowledge of the expense of transporting supplies through a swampy Wilderness I do believe that the expense of which will be incurred in six Wekks in the Spring in an attempt to trans- port the provisions for the Army along the road leading from the rapids to Detroit would build & equip the Vessels for the purpose In point of time there couldnot be three weeks difference in the accomplishment of the objects in regard to Malden & Detroit between this place & that of the land routs in the spring round the edge[?] of the lake -- And if the taking of Malden & Detroit were about[?] the object the former would I perceive be perferable in every point of view -- there is however an other Consideration which will make it necessary to obtain the naval sup- eriority upon the upper lake & the retaking of Macinac & the driving the British from their other establishments in Lake Michigan & the entrance of Lake Superior -- It is from these sources that the means of annoyance to our frontiers will be furnished to the Indians & that expeditions the most to be dreaded of any others that they can undertake will be set on foot - The Southwardly direction of Lake Michigan running [illeg.] into our Country approaches Fort W yne the settlements upon the Wabash & those of the Illinois River -- Unless we can find the means of driving the enemy from Lake Michigan early in the spring an immence Indian force aided by British Cannon & artillerists will be assembled at the southwardly bend of that Lake & its operations will be directed against Fort Wayne or Vincennes the Illinois -- as it will be impossible to tell where the storm will fall or will require an Army at each of these points to pro- tect them[?] Malden & Detroit may fall -- but those posts are not material to Macinac & St. Josephs the supplies for which & for the support of the Indians in that Quarter are drawn from Montral by means of the Grand River[?] -- All the Indian north of the Wabash can be supplied with the means of continuing the war at Chicago much easier than from Malden. Montreal will be taken perhaps by our main army but this [illeg. probably be over until the opening of the Navigation in the Spring, the first of which is always made us of to forward the supplies for the Indians by the lower route to the Lakes Michigan & Superior & should not have the means of distroying their power in those lake even if we shall succeed in taking Malden & Detroit & Montreal they will possess & will make use of the means of annoying us from thence to our extent [illeg.] will give us great trouble -- The facilities of attacking fort Wayne by an Indian force Collected at Chicago aided by British Artillery from Macinac was seen by the Indians of that quarter & it would have been attempted last fall if there had been time enough -- that the force still exists & that it will be revived in the ensuing spring & extended to embrace an attack upon our settlements upon the Wabash & Illinois & upon Fort Madison also by the route Fox River & Ouisconaga I have not the least doubt -- All that the British will wish will be a few peices of Artillery & [illeg.] twenty or thirty of their troops to each of the divisions of Indian force -- as I before observed the taking of Malden & Montreal will have no effect upon their operations for the succeeding summer -- the remedy lies in having the Command of the lakes & providing as soon as Malden falls to retake Macinac & retake Chicago --

You may rely upon it sir that the intentions of the British have al- ways been such as are here stated --

A very short time will enable me to determine upon the propriety of an Advance upon Malden during the present winter in the Mean time may I hope for your instructions. Possessed as you will be of all the reasons which will govern my conduct in the choice of Measures which I have contemplated you will be enabled to correct any error they may contain. Operations against the hostile Indians during the Winter is a sub- ject which has never ceased to occupy my attention. And the Expedition under Lt. Colo. Campbell was intended to destroy the only hostile estab- lishments which I conceived to be within the reach of an effectual stroke at this season. His being unable to distroy the principal Town from a greater accumulation of Indian force in the Neighbourhood of it than we had reason to expect determined me immediately to organize an other detachment for the purpose It was with the intention of obtaining the assistance of Govr. Meiggs in procuring some Volunteer Corps of Mounted Men that I visited Chillicothe -- With the promptitude which has ever distinguished him in complying with my requests he agreed to organ- ize as secretly as possible 500 Men to be joined to the Dragoons which served under Lt Colo Campbell & to commence their March in 4 or 5 weeks by which time I expected that the Dragoons & their horses would be suffi- ciently recruited But Upon receiving a Statement of their situation I was convinced that the Kentucky Dragoons would not be able to render any effectual service until their term of service would expire -- I have therefor directed the five troops Composing Simrals Regiment to be dis- charged -- Major Ball with his S uadron Consisting of Captn Hopkins Troop of U States Dragoons Captn Markles & Garrards 12 Months Volunteers & a small detachment of Michigan Volunteers for the same period & a Detachmt. from Pensylvania Six Months Dragoons amounting to about ten are ordered into a favorable situation to recruit -- & altho a great number of the men are very severely frost bitten & the horses very much reduced the Major gives me hopes of having them ready for active service in the Course of 4 or 5 Weeks -- the expedition Contemplated from Kentucky may however superceede the necessity of that which I was preparing -- But I am still of the opinion given yesterday that no attempt upon the enemy beyond Mississiniway would be attended with any advantage if it did not end in the distruction of the Detachment employed to execute it -- I re- peat that the Indians are not at this season to be feared in their Towns $ that they invariably take their familys with them upon their hunting ex[p]editions & that their provisions are always buried in small parcels each family hiding its own -- Colo. Campbell distroyed their villages & did not get a few of Corn a pece for his horses --

I have always calculated upon being able to keep 3 Regiments of the Kentucky troops in service as long as they shall be wanted -- these troops I am convinced would not leave me as long as there was any prospect of active service But if the operations of Army are suspended for the Winter -- they will insist upon being discharged at the termination of the period for which they were engaged -- the ten Ohio troops will also expire in Feby those from Virga & Pensylvania & Virginia in March --- It is probable that some 12 Months Volunteers may be procured[?] from them -- I have offered to give such as may engage as 12 Months Volenteers credit for the time they have served in the militia.

In making an estimate of the number of Men which may be requisite for the ensuing spring my Calculations would be governed in great degree by the determination of the Government upon the subject of obtaining the Command of the Upper Lakes -- that object effected It would in my opinion not require fewer than 5000 Men for the garrison of the posts upon this frontier & for the reduction of Malden & Detroit -- A few troops for Defiance [defense?] purpose only would answer at Vincennes & in the Ill- inois Territory In the event however of our being unable to distroy the British power on Lake Michigan early in the spring It will be necess- ary to cover those places as well as Fort Wayne each with an army of some thousands.

Provisions have been purchased & are now in progress towards the Rapids & Sandusky for 10,000 Men for one year if the advance of the Troops should be stoped for the Winter these supplies will be placed upon the St. Marys Auglaize Blanchards fork & Sandusky Rivers & boats provided to take them over upon the first rise of the waters in the Spring -- an arrangement that will save a great expense of transportation. I am not informed of the position in which the Queen Charlotte & other Canada Vessels is laid up -- if the attempt upon Malden should be abandoned for the Winter I will spare no pains to ascertain their situation and endeavour to effect their distruction.

I have requested Govr. Shelby to direct the discharge of all the Troops that served under Genl. Hopkins one Battalion excepted to be placed under the Command of Colo. Russell.

Captn Gratiot of the Engineers who has charge of peices of Artillery & the carriages for all them which have been previously forwarded as well as q quantity of stores Ammunition has met with great difficulties from the badness of the roads --He will I hope reach Sandusky in a few days By a letter received from him some time since I learn that the Carriages of all the 12 pounders are entirely unfit for service being so rotten that they are eternally breaking down.

In my letter of yesterday I mentioned the nakedness of the Regular Troops under Colo. Wells A part of the clothing has arrived here -- the ballance of it is I fear arrested by the ice on the Ohio -- There has Certainly been great negligence upon the part of some person in relation to this clothing -- the troops marched from Kenty. in Augt. to releive Genl. Hull & the Clothing for them left Philadelphia late in Novr. I beg leave also to mention to you that by the unpardonable Negligence of the Officer who examined & received them from the Manufacturer the axes which have been sent on to this army are so worthless that not above one in a Dozen will stand the Cutting of a stick six inches in diameter without bucking the recruiting rendezvous in this state are entirely without clothing

Upon the authority which I had received from the Secy of War I ordered the recruits raised in Tennessee for Colo. Andersons Regt to March for this Army -- the Colo. was upon the point of obeying the order when an other arrangement from the War office superceded it -- I have been since informed that he was ordered to New Port -- As the engagement of Volunteers for 12 Months to the extent that will be necessary to supply the place of the Militia that will be discharged is very uncertain I would beg leave to recommend that Colo. Anderson if he has not already received an order to that effect be directed to New Port there to receive his orders -- I hope that clothing will be sent on for them -- Nothing can be more distressing than to see soldiers naked at this season & nothing can certainly be more fruitful to the Public Service -- It will give you some idea of the difficulty of transporting the supplies for the Army in this Country when you are informed that the Qr Master is obliged to purchase corn below Chillicothe to make a Deposit of forage at U Sandusky a distance of 120 Miles --

I should be gratified if the President should think proper to confer a Brevet of Colonel on Lt Colo Campbell & of Lt Colo on Major Ball -- they are both highly deserving officers -- The promotion of the latter would be highly beneficial to the service as his rank at present does not authorise my giving him the Command of Detachments for whih there are few in the Army as well qualified -- Besides the U States Dragoons he has the Command of the Kentucky[?] Volunteers whose affection & Confidence he has acquired to a degree rarely equaled by his bravery firmness Humanity & indefatigable attention to his duty --

I shall do my self the Honor of writing to you again upon my arrival at Sandusky

I Have the Honor to be with great Respect Sir yr Huml Svt

Honble/ Js. Monroe Esq./ Acting Secy of War

69, 70, 71, 72, 73