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HARRISON TO MORROW [?]

No 30 Head Quarters N.W. Army

Franklinton 4th. Jany. 1813

Sir

Upon my return from Chillicothe to Upper Sandusky yr. favour of the 26th Ult. (No. 5.) overtook me at this place -- My letters & papers being all at Sandusky I have it not in my power to recur to them. But from my recollection of its Contents I regret that a letter which I addressed to the Sey of War from Delaware about the 12th. Ultimo had not been received before yours of the 26th. was written -- In that letter I stated the causes which had retarded our progress towards Detroit my then prospects & what might under various occurrences be expected from this army.

When I was directed to take the Command in the latter end of Septr. I thought it possible by great exertions to effect the objects of the Campaign before the setting in of winter -- I distinctly stated however to the Secretary of War that there was always a period of rainy weather in this Country in the Months[?] of November & December in which the roads within the settlements were almost impassable & the swamps which extend northwardly from About the fortieth degree of latitude entirely so and that this circumstance would render it impossible to advance with the Army before that period with out exposing it to inevitable destruct- ion unless a sufficiency of provisions could be taken on to sibsist it A until the severe frosts should remove the impediments to transportation But in order to take advantage of every Circumstance in our favor boats & perogues were prepared in considerable numbers upon the Auglaize & St. Marys Rivers in the hope that when the land transportation Could not be used we might by the means of these Rivers take on very large supplies to the Rapids of Miamis. An effort was made also to procure flour from Presquile by coasting the lake with small boats -- These measures were calculated on as Collatteral aids only -- The most [illeg.] one of pro- viding a large number of pack horses & ox teams was resorted to -- And the Dy Quarter Master Genl Colo Morrison was instructed accordingly -- Con- sidering the Miami Rapids as the first point of Destination provisions were ordered to be accumulated along a Concave base extending from St Marys (Called on the Map Girtys town) -- on the last to the Mouth of the Huron (& afterwards lower Sandusky) on the right.

A The Experience of a few Days was sufficient to Convince me that the supplies of provision could not be procured for an Autumnal advance & even if this difficulty was removed an other of equal magnitude existed from the want of Artillery There remained then no alternative but to prepare for a winter Campaign

From this base the rapids Could be approached by three routes or lines of operation two of which were pretty effectually secured by the posts which were established & the [illeg.] upon the third St. Marys McArthur Block house (44 miles advanced of Urbanna) & Upper Sandusky were selected as principal deposits. The troops excepting those with Genl Winchester were Kept within the bounds of the local Contractors that they might not consume the provisions procured by the U States Commissary & which were intended to formthe grand Deposits at the Miami Rapids -- It was not until late in October that much effect could be given to these arrangements -- & for the six following weeks little or nothing could be done from the uncommon unfavorable state of the Weather affording just rain enough to render the roads almost impassable for Waggons & yet not sufficiency to raise the Waters to a Navigable state --- great exertions were however made to prepare for the Change which might reasonably be expected and the last twenty days of December were entirely favorable to our views & so well employed by Colo. Morrison as to afford the most flattering prospects of being able to take on to the rapids early in this Month a Sufficiency of provisions & stores to authorise an advance upon Malden from the 25th. Inst. to the 10 of Feby -- Our hopes were again a little checked by a general thaw succeeded by a very deep snow which the ground was in that soft state -- It is however now Cold again & we calculate upon being able to use with effect the sleds a Considerable number of which I had caused to be prepared

The instructions which I received from the Secy Mr Eustis with regard to the Conduct of the War in this Department Amounted to a Complete Charte Blanche -- The principal objects of the Campaign were pointed out & I was left.at liberty to proceed to their full execution during the present Winter or to make arrangements for their accomplishment in the spring by occupying such posts as might facilitate the extended operation -- The wishes of the Government to recover the ground that had been lost & to conquer upon Canada were however expressed in such strong terms & the funds which were placed at my disposal were declared to be so ample if not unlimitted that I did not consider myself Authorised to adopt the alternative of delay from any other Motive but that of the safety of the army. My letters have Contained frequent alusions to the Monstrous expense which would attend the operation of an army at this season of the year penetrating to the enemy through an immence forest of one Hundred fifty Miles the Silence of the secy on the subject left me no room to doubt the Correctness of the opinion which I had at first formed ie that the object in view was considered so important that expence was to be disregarded. I thought it but however to come to a full understanding on the subject & with this view my letter of the 12th. Ult (as I think) from Delaware was written --

My plan of operations has been & now is to occupy the Miami Rapids & to Deposit there as much provision as possible -- To move from thence with a Choosen Detachment of the Army & with as much provision artillery & Ammunition as the Means of transportation will allow -- Make a Demon- stration towards Detroit & by a sudden passage of the straight upon the ice an actual investure of Malden -- In the letter from Delaware above aluded to I explained my objections to the occupancy of Detroit until Malden should fall -- The latter in the Hands of the enemy with a Disposible force of half the size of that with which we should advance to the former would place us completely in a Cul de sac. With regard to the Amount of force which such an expedition would require -- I have made my Calculations not upon that which the enemy might have at Malden at the time the enterprize should commence but upon what they would be able to assemble in their time enough to visit us. I know the facility with whi- ch troops may be brought at this season by what is called the back route along the river Thames from the Vicinity of Niagara to Detroit & Malden. Had Genl Smyths attempts been successful my plans could have been executed with a Much smaller force than I should deem it prudent to employ under present Circumstances -- I have indeed no doubt that we shall encounter at Malden the very troops which Contended with Genl. Van Ransalaer on the Heights of Queenstown-- It is the same thing with regard to the Indians -- The British have wisely dismissed the greater part of them to save their provisions but a whistle will be almost suff- icient to collect them again -- There is an other consideration which must have considerable influence in determining the number of men necess- ary to make an attempt upon Malden it is this that the numbers of Indians & Canadians which will be opposed to us will be in an inverse ratio to the force which we employ -- To distroy a small army the timid the wavering & the cautious will all turn but if our force is such as to create a belief that its operation will be successful both those des- criptions of people will stand along ready to capture the side that may prove Victorious But the quantum of force necessary for the enterprize against Malden may be greatly lessened by our having the Means of trans- portation at the rapids to take on [illeg.] Artillery & stores & a suff- iciency of provisions to last until the object is affected -- but if the suplies are to be taken on at several Trips large Escorts (amounting of themselves to small armies) will be necessary more time will be required & consequently a much larger quantity of provisions wanted -- Such is the nature of Indian Warfare that it is impossible to tell when the storms will fall -- it [is] a rule therefore with me when operating against them never to make a Detachment meither[?] to the front or rear which is not able to Contend with their whole force. From this statement you will perceive sir how difficult it would be for me at present to ascertain with any degree of Correctness the number of Men with which I should ad- vance from the Rapids It was my intention to have assembed there from 4500 to 5000 men & to be governed by circumstances in forming the Detach- ment with which I should advance. It is still my plan & it was always my intention to dismiss at that period all that I deemed superfluous -- The Nature of our fortifications upon the frontiers required a much larger force for their protection than would be requisite it they were capable to [blotted out] artillery -- A few hundred Indians assisted by half a dozen British Matrosses & a six pounder would take any of them -- Notwithstanding the large nominal amount of the Army under my Command their suffering from the want of Clothing & the rigour of the season renders the effective number to less than two thirds of the aggregate -- You will read with as much pain as I write it that a fine body of regular troops belonging to the 19th & 17th & l9th Rgts under Colo Wells has been nearly distroyed for the want of Clothing -- the whole of the effective men upon [illeg.] frontier does not exceed 6300 Infantry Upon the whole sir my reaching Malden during the winter depends upon a Circumstance which I cannot Controle Viz the freezing of the straight in such a manner as to enable me tdcross over the Troops & Artillery -- I have explained to you my objections to making any attempt upon Detroit until Malden should be taken, should however my view of the subject be incorrect I will cheerfully undertake whatever you may direct -- And must require you to determine whether it would be proper to ad- vance to Detroit if the openness of the Winter & other Causes should in my opinion render an attempt upon Malden improper? Genl Winchester is I hope now or will in a day or two be at the rapids provisions in large quantities are progressing thither. I calculate upon being there myself by the 20th. Inst. with the troops which are intended for the March upon Malden. In the event of the [illeg.] of Circumstances which may induce a suspension of operations beyond the Rapids Measures will be taken to make & to secure at that place a deposit of provisions equal to the support of the Troops in any enterprize that may be undertaken in the spring -- Should our offensive operations be suspended until that time it is my decided opinion that the most effectual and [illeg.] plan will be to obtain the Command of the lake this being over [very?] effective; every difficulty will be removed -- An Army of 4000 Men landed on the North side of the lake below Malden will soon reduce that place & its [illeg.] of with the line of the fleet [illeg.] the latter to Cooperate with the Army for Niagara.

The enterprize against the Queen Charlotte has been long meditated & shall not evade my attention.

My anxiety to get of this letter [in] time enough to reach Chilli- cothe for the Mail of tomorrow has obliged me to write it with a pre- cipitancy which may have prevented me from giving you all the explanations required I will however rephrase it Tomorrow & will have the honor of writing to you again previously to my setting out for Sandusky -- The object of my visit to Chillicothe was to consult with Govr.

Meiggs upon the means of raising a mounted force for an other expedition to Mississiniway -- this subject shall also be noticed.

I am sorry not to be able to agree with my friend Colo. Johnson upon the propriety of the Counter-plot Mounted expedition -- An Expedi- tion of the kind directed against a particular town will probably succeed The Indian Towns cannot be surprized in succession -- as they give the alarm from one to the other with much more rapidity than our Troops can move -- In the Months of February & March & April the Towns are all abandoned -- the Men are Hunting & women & Children particularly to the North of the Wabash) are scattered about making sugar -- The Corn is at that season universally put in small parcells in the earth & Could not be found -- there is no considerable Tawa Village in that direction & those that are there Composed of bark huts which the Indians do not care for & which during the Winter are entirely empty.

The Detachment Might pass through the whole extent of Country to be scoured without seeing an Indian but at the first town they strike & it is more than probable that they would find it empty -- But the expedition is impracticable to the extent proposed-- the Horses if not the men would perish -- The Horses, which are not to be found are not like those of the early settlers & such as the Indians & Traders now have -- they have been accustomed to Corn & must have it -- Colo Campbell went but 70 Miles from the frontiers & the greater part of his horses Could scarcely be brought in -- Such An Expedition in the Summer & fall would be highly ad- vantageous -- because the Indians are then at their towns & their Corn can then be distroyed.

An attack upon a particular Town in the winter when the inhabitants are in it (as we know they are at Mississiniway) & which is so near as to enable the Detachmt. to reach it & return without killing their horses is not only practicable but if there is snow upon the ground is perhaps the most favorable time -- & small parties might be employed to great advant- age searching for & attacking their Hunting Camps --

I have the Honor to be with the greatest Respect sir yr. Hl Svt

Honbl

Ms. Morrow Es.

65, 66, 67, 68