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HARRISON TO EUSTIS

(No 24) Head Quarters Delaware

December 12th. 1812

Sir,

Since I had the honor to write to you on the Ultimo every exertion has been made and every Engine put into operation to procure and forward supplies for the Army to the advanced posts. The difficulties which have and which are still to be encountered in this business are almost in- superable but they are opposed with unabated firmness and Zeal. The great- est obstacle to our success is the want of forage which for this time we are obliged to bring from the Neighbourhood of Chillicothe at an immence expence which can scarcely be conceived. Genl. Perkins informs me that two men have lately arrived at his Camp from Detroit and from them he learnt that the British had taken from the Inhabitants of the Michigan Territory every thing which they deemed surplus provisions leaving the Inhabitants scarcely enough to live on. I fear too that they have taken all the Corn from the Rapids as neither Gen Winchester nor Gen Perkins have made any effectual attempts to interrupt them. Gen Perkins has been able to save between two and three thousand Bushels of Corn at lower Sandusky, and there are persons actively employed at and above Cleveland procuring every thing that will answer for the sustenance of man or Beast as long as the lake remains open and when it freeses upon Sleds which are preparing. I received letters from St Marys under the date of the 1st of this Month. at that time the Waters were all in a navigable state Boats and Perogues were loading at St Marys and a number of others coming up the Auglaize to load at Tawa Town. Had the open weather continued but for a few days longer Gen Winchester would have received from one thousand to fifteen hundred Barrels of flour by this, but I fear that the hard Frosts which we have had for some days past will prevent the Boats from returning and possible the General from descending to the Rapids to which he was directed immediately to proceed. Gen Perkins is at lower Sandusky with all his Brigade. A Battallion of the Pennsylvania Troops reached upper Sandusky yesterday with the twenty one pieces of artillery brought on by Lieut Hukill. The sending them from Mansfield with two small [?] was extremely injudicious upon the part of Gen Crooks. I directed another Regiment to follow them but as they may not arrive for several days I shall send on today some Companies of the Virginia Brigade and shall follow myself the day after. The Virginis Brigade has been here since the ultimo, they were detained for the want of Blankets which reached them only last Evening, But from the failure of the Contractors in pro- viding the means of subsisting them at Sandusky they could not have marched unless the provisions purchased by the United States Commissary had been issued to them. Major Denny and his agents have not requitted themselves as they might have done. In upwards of two Months they have procured and forwarded not more than eighteen hundred Barrels of Flour. The last accounts from the lake were not very flattering. Seven of eight hundred Barrels were scattered in small parcels below Cleveland, a part of it has probably reached Sandusky but the severe Weather which we have had for some days has no doubt interrupted the navigation.

I beg leave to call your attention to the Enclosed extract of a letter from Col Morrison. I fear that the Expences of this army will greatly exceed the calculations of the Government. The prodigious distruction of Horses can only be conceived by those who have been accustomed to military operations in a Wilderness in the Winter Season. The fine Teams which arrived on the l0th Inst at Sandusky with the Artillery are entirely worn down and two trips from McArthurs Block House (our nearest Deposit to the Rapids) will completely destroy a Brigade of Pack Horses. Should I be able to get on one Million or even eight hundred thousand Rations of Flour at the Rapids and the Weather is severe enough to Freeze the straight the object of the Campaign can be accomplished. A few Horses would be sufficient to take on the supplies and Baggage upon the ice and if the Straight feeeses I should be able to set down before Malden (without going to Detroit) in six days from my leaving the Rapids. If on the Contrary the Straight does not freeze (which is frequently the case) the difficulty of crossing will be very considerable and it will require much time to build Boats to effect the passage. All that could be done then would be the recovery of Detroit late in February or perhaps the Middle of March. The Government will determine whether that object is of sufficient importance of induce them to bear the expence which will attend the prosecution of the Campaign at this Season. If there were not some important political reason urging the recovery of the Michigan Territory and the capture of Malden as soon as those objects can possibly be effected and that to accomplish them a few Weeks sooner expence was to be disregarded, I should not hesitate to say that if a small pro- portion of the sums which will be expended in the Quarter Masters Department in the active prosecution of the Campaign during the Winter was devoted to the obtaining the command of Lake Erie, the wishes of the Government in their utmost extent could be accomplished without difficulty in the Months of April and May. Malden Detroit and Macinac would fall in rapid Succession. On the contrary all that can certainly promise to be accomplished during the Winter unless the Straight should afford us a passage upon the ice is to recover Detroit. I must further observe that no Military man would think of retaining Detroit, (Malden being in possession of the Enemy) unless his army was at least twice as strong as the disposeable force of the Enemy. An army advancing to Detroit along a lin e of operation passing so near the principal force of the Enemy as to allow them access to it whenever they think proper must be covered by another army more considerable than the disposeable force of the Enemy. I mention this circumstance to shew that the attack ought not to be directed Detroit but against Malden and that it depends upon the ice affording a safe passage across the Straight whether I shall be able to proceed in this way or not. Detroit is not tenable, Were I to take it without having it in my power to occupy the opposite Shore I should be under the necessity of hiding the army in the adjacent Swamp to preserve it from the effect of the shot and shells' which the Enemy would throw with impunity from the opposite Shore. This result is so obvious to every man who has the least military information that it appears to me as extraordinary as any other part of Genl. Hulls conduct that he should chuse to defend Detroit rather than attack Malden There is another circumstance, Sir, which will claim attention. Admitting that Malden and Detroit are both taken, Macinac and St Josephs will remain in the hands of the Enemy until we can create a force capable of contending with the Vessels which the British have in lake Michigan and which they will be enabled to maintain these as long as the Canoe route by grand river and lake Nissisin shall remain open and for six months after.

I have conceived it proper sir, to lay these statement a before you. If it should be asked why they were not made sooner I answer that altho I was always sensible that these were great difficulties to be encountered in the accomplishment of the wishes of the President in rel- ation to the recovery of Detroit and the conquest of the adjacent part of Upper Canada in the manner proposed, I did not make sufficient allow- ance for the imbecility and inexperience of the public agents and the Villainy of the Contractors. I am still however very far from believing that the Original is impracticable I believe on the contrary that it can be effected. And as I know that my personal fame is materially interested in its success inthe manner first propose, my feelings are all engaged in opposition to any delay. But I should illy deserve the confidence of the people or the President if I were capable of being influenced by a private consideration to withhold from the Government any statement which might throw light upon the operations of an army the success of which is so important to the Character as well as to the Interest of the Country. If it should be the determination to disregard expence and push on the operations of the army in the manner that they have been commenced the President may rely upon the Exertions of the Troops which I shall employ in the final effort. I shall be much disappointed if I cannot select three or four thousand men from the army who will do as much as the same number of men in a similar state of discipline ever did do. If this play of acquiring the naval Superiority upon the lakes before the attempt is made on Malden or De- troit should be adopted I would place fifteen hundred Men in Cantonments at the Miami Rapids (Defiance would be better if the Troops had not ad- vanced from thence) retain about one thousand more to be distributed in different Garrisons -- accumulate provisions at St Marys Tawa Town, upper Sandusky, Cleveland and Presqui isle, and employ the Dragoons and mounted Infantry in desultory expeditions against the Indians. The Villages south of lake Michigan might be struck with effect by making a Deposit of Corn and provision at Fort Wayne. Col Campbell marched from Franklin with the detachment destined to destroy the Miami Villages on the Ultimo. His Troops were mounted and paid at Xenia and left Dayton on the 9th Inst. I have the Honor to enclose you an extract of a letter from him of the 1st describing his situation and prospects. There never was a finer body of men. I also enclose the Orders given to him which I hope will meet with your approbation.

I am much disappointed in the artillery which has been sent on. There are in all twenty eight pieces of which ten are six's and ten twelve pounders, the former are nearly useless. I had five before and if I had an hundred I should only take three or four with me. You will perceive by the return of Capt Gratiott which is enclosed that all the Carriages for the Howitzers and eight out of ten of those for the twelve pounders are unfit for use.

Since I began this I have recd a letter from Cleveland. The Asst Quarter Master there has been very successful in procuring Forage. Better News I could scarcely have rbceived.

I have the Honor to be &c Willm Henry Harrison

The Honbl
W Eustis Esqr
Secretary of War --

57, 58, 59