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HARRISON TO EUSTIS

Lexington 10th August 1812

Sir, (IMPORTANT)

Upon my arrival at Frankfort on Saturday last I was favoured by Gov Scott with the perusal of a late communication from Gov. Edwards covering a number of Documents which unequivocally prove the existence of a Combination amongst the Indian Tribes more formidable than any pre- vious one. And as the only obstacle to the Commencement of offensive operations on their part (the want of Ammunition) has been removed by the taking of Macinac I have determined to order four Company of Indiana Militia to March from the Counties bordering on the Ohio to Vincennes and they will soon be followed by a Regiment from this State. I have also informed Gov Scott that all the remaining part of the Quota of this state will be required for active Service North West of the Ohio. Pre- viously to the taking of any other steps however I have thought it proper to recur to you for further Instructions and most respectfully to offer you the result of my Reflections on the Subject of the Employment of the disposable force in this quarter of our Country. As it appears from your letter of the 9th Ultimo that the Government had determined on offensive measures against the Belligerent Indians the Fact then to be considered is the nature and extent of those measures. Two species of warfare have been used by the United States in their Contests with the Tribes upon the North Western Frontier, Viz rapid and desultory Expedi- tions by Mounted Men having for their object the suprise and destruction of particular Villages or the more tardy but more effectual operations of an Army composed principally of Infantry penetrating the Country of the Enemy and securing the possession by a chain of Posts. In the war which was terminated by the Peace of Greenville both of those plans were used but the former as auxilliary only to the latter which was regarded as the effectual means for procuring and preserving peace. If under present Circumstances the Government should think proper to rely upon desultory Expeditions only they will naturally be directed against those Village[s] of the Enemy which are nearest and which of course would most annoy our Settlements -- But the direction to be given to an army of the other description requires more attentive consideration. In the present posture of affairs it appears to me that one of the two plans which I have the honor to submit might be adopted with advantage. The first is to establish a Chain of Posts upon the Illinois River from the Mississippi to Chicago and the other to march immediately a considerable Body of Troops to Fort Wayne. If it were certain that General Hull would be able even with the reenforcement which is now about to be sent to him to re- duce Malden and retake Macinac there would be no necessity of sending other Troops in that direction. But I greatly fear that the Capture of Macinac will give such eclat to the British and Indian arms that the Northern Tribes will pour down in swarms upon Detroit, oblige General Hull to act entirely upon the defensive and meet and perhaps overpower the Convoys and reinforcements which may be sent him. It appears to me indeed highly probable that the large detachment which is now destined for his relief under Colonel Wells will have to fight its way -- I rely greatly upon the valour of those Troops but it is possible that the Event may be adverse to us and if it is Detroit must fall and with it every hope of reestablishing our affairs in that Quarter until the next year. I am also apprehensive that the Provisions which are to be sent with Colonel Wells are by no means equal to the supply of the Army for any length of time increased as it will be by this Detachment. They must then depend upon smaller Convoys which can never reach their destination in Safety if the British and Indians think proper to prevent it, command- ing as they do the navigation of the lake the British can with the ut- most facility transfer their force from one side of it to the other, meet our Detachments and overpower them if they are small whilst performing a laborious and circuitous march through a swampy Country at any point they think proper. To prevent these disasters or to remedy them should they occur a considerable covering army appears to me to be the only alter- native. For should any of my apprehensions be realized it is out of the Question to suppose that Troops could be collected time enough to render any essential service. There are other considerations which strongly recommends the adoption of this measure, I mean the situation of Chicago which must be in danger and if it is not well supplied with provisions the danger must be imminent. It is possible sir, that every thing may yet go on well, that no considerable number of Indians may be collected at Malden, and that our Detachments and Convoys may reach their Des- tination in safety; the reverse however appears to me to be the most pro- bable, and I am fully persuaded that the opinions and wishes of the People in the Western Country are unanimously in favour of the most vigorous and effectual measures. In this state particularly the spirit of the people is arrived to the highest pitch and the Government may rely upon their utmost efforts. To be furnished with Arms and to be allowed to exert their Energies to reestablish our affairs upon the North Western Frontiers is earnestly desired by every description of person An army going in the proposed direction particularly if it was sent to Fort Wayne would serve as a considerable Check upon the Tribes of the Wabash and those of the West and South of Lake Michigan. Supplies could be easily procured in the highly cultivated part of the Ohio between the Miami and Scioto Rivers. If the plan here proposed should be adopted, some display of military force by way of demonstration would be highly useful both at Vincennes and in the Neighbourhood [of] Cahokia or St. Louis. Indeed some Troops are necessary for the defence of these places and the adjacent Settlements.

The only objection to the scheme of erecting a chain of Posts from the Mississippi to Chicago arises from the lateness of the Season which would perhaps render it impossible to collect the supplies which are necessary for the very large force that this Expedition would require. It could not be undertaken with a probability of success with less than 5000 Men. Moving in the manner proposed the Indians would be apprised of the object and there can be no doubt that every effort would be made to defeat it and as little that they would be enabled to collect a force at least equal to that which I have stated as the necessary amount for ours. If the advanced Season should prevent the plan from being completed it might at least be so far effected as to occupy Leoni (an important point) and erect an intermediate Post between it and the Mouth of the Illinois River. A Slight inspection of the Map of that Country and reference to the positions of the several Tribes will at once explain the great advant- age to be derived from a prosecution of the plan. It would as completely cover our settlements as a Chain of Posts can cover them, and it would have the effect so highly desirable of bringing the Indian Tribes to a general and decisive action.

From the enclosed letter from Capt Wells it appears that the Prophet had abandoned all Idea of remaining upon the Wabash and that it was his intention to return after making a stroke at our Settlements to the Country of the Winebagos. As the orders of Tecumseh were given however under the impression that Malden would shortly fall into our hands it is highly probably that the procrastination of that Event and the suspension of offensive operations upon the part of General Hulls Army has inspired other hopes and given rise to other schemes - If this should be the case and he remains upon the Wabash and neither of the other plans to be executed by the army proposed to be collected at Fort Wayne. With the opinion I entertain of the situation of affairs at Detroit I give a de- cided preference to the Fort Wayne Expedition. I do think it highly probable that the Indians have been collected in very considerable num- bers to return their Friends at Malden, but I have no further Evidence of it nor indeed of the extensive combination which I suppose to exist amongst the Indian Tribes that what or will be before you at the time you receive this.

Your favour of the 9th Inst I have submitted to Gov. Scott, Mr. Clay, Mr. Bledsoe and other conspicuous Friends all recommended that the administration here and they have I should not put any other part of the Troops in motion until I hear from you excepting the few Companies that have been ordered for the protection of Vincennes Should the Government think proper to authorise the Employment of a larger force than the amount of the Quota ordered from this state no fears need be entertains of its not being obtained. I will pledge myself to raise in ten days two thousand men for any Expedition which may be authorised wholly independent of the regular militia or of the quota which has been organized. I am constantly solicited to suffer independent Companies to be raised of both Horse and Infantry. I should be thankful to be informed of the pro- portion of Cavalry which I may command. It is a description of force to which I am very partial in Indian Warfare. If a sufficiency of swords and Pistols cannot be procured I would recommend that some of the Dragoon-. Companies be armed with the Small Rifles now used by the United States Rifle Corps.

I have the Honor &c. Willm Henry Harrison

The Honble
William Eustis Esqr
Secy of War.

18, 19, 20