

THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES

How Hubris, Economics, Bad Timing and Slavery

Sank King Cotton Diplomacy with England

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Individual Paper

All you need in this life is ignorance and confidence, and then the success is sure.

-Mark Twain

DISASTROUS OVERCONFIDENCE

The ancient Greeks viewed *hubris*¹ as a character flaw that, left unrecognized, caused personal destruction. What is true for a person may be true for a people. For the Confederate States of America, excessive faith in cotton, both its economic and cultural aspects, contributed mightily to its entry into, and ultimate loss of, the Civil War. The eleven states that seceded from the Union viewed British support as both a necessity for Southern success and a certainty, given the Confederacy's status as the largest (by far) supplier of cotton to Britain. Yet, there was a huge surplus of cotton in Britain when the war began. Moreover, cotton culture's reliance on slavery presented an insurmountable moral barrier. Southern over-confidence and its strong twin beliefs in the plantation culture and the power of cotton, in the face of countervailing moral values and basic economic laws, blinded the Confederacy to the folly of King Cotton diplomacy.

THE CONFLICT: KING COTTON AND SLAVERY

Well before the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the South exhibited deep confidence in cotton's economic power abroad. During the Bloody Kansas debate,² South Carolina senator James Henry Hammond boasted, "in [the South] lies the great valley of Mississippi...soon to be

¹ excessive pride

² In 1858, Congress debated whether Kansas should be admitted into the Union as a free state or slave state. The debate became a quarrel over the expansion of slavery in the United States territories.

the acknowledged seat of the empire of the world.”³ Hammond’s speech reflected the general belief that the South would flourish as an independent, agricultural nation.⁴ In January 1861, after the secession of South Carolina, *Debow’s Review* stated that “a stoppage of the raw material from the cotton States of the South...would produce the most disastrous political results – if not a revolution in England.”⁵

However, despite their economic ties to the South, the British public had long regarded slavery as a moral evil, as reflected by the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833.⁶ The *London Times* described abolitionist-based support for Abraham Lincoln as “the tardy echo of those humane doctrines to which England has so long become a convert.”⁷ Southern plantation culture was in clear conflict: “the greatest strength of the South arises from the harmony of her political and social institutions...in all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life.”⁸ Virginia clergyman Thornton Stringfellow and South Carolina Chancellor William Harper also asserted that Southern slaves were morally and physically healthier than the working classes of Britain.⁹ These justifications did little to change the British mindset. The *Times* proclaimed on January 9, 1861 that “there is a right and wrong in this question, and...the right belongs to the States of the North.”¹⁰

³ America’s Civil War: Professor John C. Willis, “James Henry Hammond, Cotton is King, March 4, 1858,” Sewanee University, http://www.sewanee.edu/faculty/Willis/Civil_War/documents/HammondCotton.html (accessed December 20, 2010).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ J.D.B. Debow, ed., “Secession of the Cotton States,” *Debow’s Review* 30, no. 1 (January 1861): 95, University of Michigan: Humanities Text Initiative, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu> (accessed December 8, 2010).

⁶ Piece of British legislation ridding the empire (except Ceylon, Saint Helena, and East India Company lands) of slavery.

⁷ Editorial, “The Further Accounts,” *London Times*, November 21, 1860, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 26, 2010).

⁸ “James Henry Hammond, Cotton is King, March 4, 1858.”

⁹ J.H. Hammond, “Letter I,” in *Slavery in Light of Political Science* (Augusta: Pritchard, Abbott & Loomis, 1860), 657.

¹⁰ Editorial, “The Southern People,” *London Times*, January 9, 1861, in *Europe Looks at the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 38.

As a counterweight to this moral perspective, trade considerations also influenced the British attitude on the question of recognizing the Confederacy. In 1860, American cotton accounted for approximately 80% of Great Britain's total imports; the East Indies, West Indies, and Brazils combined exported a meager 4% of British imports.¹¹ Recognizing the precarious implications, the *Times* wondered in January 1861 why "a trading class pre-eminently distinguished for commercial intelligence should have been so quietly dependent on one source for the supply of their raw material."¹² The paper estimated in September of that year that one-fifth of the British population was at the mercy of Southern cotton.¹³ However, British attempts in the 1850s to find other suppliers failed.¹⁴ The Indian cotton, produced by British tools and in accordance with British instructions, time and again lacked the workability of Southern cotton.¹⁵ This echoed British official Major Wingate's assessment in *Debow's Review*, "I think it is quite a mistake to suppose that India could, under any circumstances...render England independent of America."¹⁶

Lincoln's remark in his First Inaugural Address that he had "no inclination" to abolish slavery¹⁷ initially permitted the British to sidestep their moral conflict with Southern culture.¹⁸ If the Civil War had not involved a struggle over ideals of human freedom, Britain may have

¹¹ Chart, in R. Arthur Arnold, *The History of the Cotton Famine from the Fall of Sumter to the Passing of the Public Works Act* (London: Saunder, Otley, and 1856). 26.

¹² *London Times*, "The Supply of Cotton," <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 26, 2010).

¹³ Ephraim Douglass Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925), 6-7.

¹⁴ Frank Lawrence Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ J.D.B. Debow, ed., "India Cotton Competition Still a Failure." *Debow's Review* 26, no. 1 (January 1859): 85-86. University of Michigan: Humanities Text Initiative (accessed December 26, 2010). See Appendix I for a chart showing European dependence on Southern cotton.

¹⁷ Abraham Lincoln, "First Inaugural Address" (speech), <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html> (accessed December 26, 2010).

¹⁸ Owsley, 206-209.

justified a closer relationship with their cotton suppliers, the Confederacy.¹⁹ In fact, British newspapers such as the *Times* and the *Economist* characterized the North's desire to save the Union as greedy.²⁰ British support first swayed toward the South, and the magazine *Punch* commented:

Though with the North we sympathise
It must not be forgotten
that with the South we've stronger ties
which are composed of cotton.²¹

EMBARGOES

In January 1861, the *Times* considered the prospective impact of a blockade and concluded that "the actual position of affairs...show[s] the mistake²² which the Lancashire people have committed."²³ On April 19, 1861 the Union in fact imposed a blockade along the Southern coast.²⁴ Despite the *Times's* commentary, depression in Lancashire and other mill towns was inevitable because of the importations of 1860.²⁵

Later, when cotton had fallen into short supply, Jefferson Davis, perhaps overplaying his hand to encourage intervention, promoted a self-embargo²⁶ and cotton burning to prevent shipment.²⁷ Abolitionist Peter Sinclair, recognizing this deception, begged Britain to realize that "the blockade has nothing to do with the barbarous conduct of the men who come here seeking

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Which Are Composed of Cotton." *Punch*, March 30, 1861, in *Europe Looks at the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 44.

²² "The mistake" refers to Lancashire's dependence on the Confederacy as their largest cotton provider.

²³ "The Lancashire Manufacturers," *London Times*, January 24, 1861, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 27, 2010).

²⁴ Sideman and Friedman, 155.

²⁵ Arnold, 32-33.

²⁶ "King Cotton in the Civil War," The American Civil War Home Page, Cotton in the Confederacy, <http://www.civilwarhome.com/kingcotton.htm> (accessed December 20, 2010).

²⁷ Peter Sinclair, *Freedom or Slavery in the United States*, in *Europe Looks at the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 154-156.

to recognized as a separate and independent people...they want [the blockade] raised that they may be enabled to carry on the war.”²⁸

GLUT, DEPRESSION, FAMINE, AND RECOVERY

Before the outbreak of the Civil War, the South readily fed the British appetite for cotton. In 1859, Britain imported 3,127,568 of the total 4,666,770 bales produced by the South.²⁹ The following year, of the 3,656,086 bales produced, the South shipped 3,126,568 to Britain.³⁰ This supply fueled manufacturing of finished goods, but consumption failed to keep pace with skyrocketing production.³¹ This ultimately led to production shutdowns, and British cotton towns, most notably Lancashire, began their decline in October 1861. Unprecedented depression,³² unemployment and poverty ran rampant, climaxing in 1862.³³ Contrary to the Southern expectation of a cotton famine,³⁴ the over-supply and runaway production of 1859 and 1860 had created a glut of cotton and finished goods.³⁵ The ensuing slump discouraged blockade running as the British feared the influx of more cotton.³⁶ Southern cotton diplomacy rested on false economic premises.³⁷ From an economic standpoint, the timing of Southern secession could not have been worse.³⁸

²⁸ Ibid, 155.

²⁹ Owsley, 146-147.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Arnold, 32-33.

³² Ibid.

³³ Owsley, 149.

³⁴ Owsley, 146.

³⁵ Arnold, 32-32.

³⁶ Owsley, 152.

³⁷ Ibid, 146.

³⁸ Ibid, 146. Owsley implies that if the South had timed their secession with a British cotton shortage, the British may have been more motivated to recognize the South or even intervene in the war.

As the Lancashire depression deepened, the glut relaxed and further eroded into a cotton famine in 1862.³⁹ Characterized by the *Times* as the “greatest national trial that we have had since the Irish famine,”⁴⁰ the cotton famine did provide the South with the opportunity to promote British recognition of the Confederacy and even intervention.⁴¹

However, organized charity efforts undermined Southern plans for British support.⁴² The International Relief Committee of New York provided impoverished towns with flour, money, and other necessities.⁴³ The Poor Law Board and Guardians of the Poor soothed suffering workers.⁴⁴ These relief efforts caused British workers’ consistent belief in neutrality to hold firm.⁴⁵ The Liverpool Chamber of Commerce wrote in 1863 that “men of all shades of opinion would rejoice to see this war terminated in any way that would not be inconsistent with your honor as a people.”⁴⁶ The Lancashire unemployed sang: “our mules and looms have ceased to work, the Yankees are the cause...we still stand by English laws / no recognizing shall take place, until the war is o’er.”⁴⁷

Anticipating the upcoming depression, the *Times* wrote in 1861 that “never did so much depend on a mere flock of down.”⁴⁸ However, by mid-1863, conditions in Lancashire had

³⁹ Owsley, 146.

⁴⁰ *London Times*, “No One Can Doubt the Full Sincerity,” November 14, 1862, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 29, 2010).

⁴¹ Owsley, 146.

⁴² Owsley, 13.

⁴³ Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman, *Europe Looks at the Civil War*. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 178.

⁴⁴ Owsley, 157-158.

⁴⁵ Sideman and Friedman, 179-180.

⁴⁶ “Our Country Accepts with Gratitude” R.A. Macfie to George Griswald, February 1863, in *Europe Looks At the Civil War* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 179.

⁴⁷ “Song of the Unemployed Cotton Workers,” in *Europe Looks At the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 180.

⁴⁸ “There is a Cry for Cotton,” *London Times*, June 21, 1861, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 27, 2010).

improved, as evidenced by the 35,465 cotton workers returning to work by April of that year.⁴⁹

Increased importation of Indian, Egyptian, Brazilian and Chinese cotton also contributed to improving conditions and obviated the economic case for British support.⁵⁰

DIPLOMACY AND PROPAGANDA

The Confederacy pursued propaganda to sway British public opinion. Starting in May 1862, Henry Hotze published *The Index*, a weekly London journal,⁵¹ emphasizing the connection between recognition of the Confederacy and the well being of Europe:

[T] here is indeed, no problem...so essential to Europe at the present moment as that which involves the question, whether a new Power is really added to the family of nations, whether a great outlet for industry, and a vast field for the enterprise of the Old World, are cleared from artificial obstructions.⁵²

As British focus turned toward the slavery issue in 1863, Hotze argued for placing England's wealth and self-interest above her moral reservations.⁵³ Hotze rationalized moral concerns, pointing to the worldwide recognition of Russia, which practiced serfdom into the nineteenth century.⁵⁴ Hotze further asserted that moral approval and diplomatic recognition were unrelated.⁵⁵ James Spence, perhaps the British equivalent of Hotze,⁵⁶ championed states' rights in *The Constitutional Right of Secession* and described secession's place in American history,

⁴⁹ Owsley, 155.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 155-156.

⁵¹ Owsley writes on 191-192 that Southern overconfidence led to an early lack of effort in actual diplomacy; Hotze was poorly paid, and Confederates relied on the sole power of cotton alone.

⁵² "Song of the Unemployed Cotton Workers," in *Europe Looks at the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 180.

⁵³ Henry Hotze, "What Prevents the Recognition of the Confederate States?," *The Index*, Jan 22, 1863, in *Henry Hotz, Confederate Propagandist: Selected Writings on Revolution, Recognition, and Race*, ed. Lonnie A. Burnett (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2008), 141.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Owsley, 186.

from the Convention of Hartford⁵⁷ to the Civil War.⁵⁸ Hotze's and Spence's ideas found support in Northern England with the establishment of the Manchester Southern Independence Association and London Southern Independence Association.⁵⁹

There were other instances of Confederate success in Britain. After the *Virginia's* failure at sea,⁶⁰ Confederate diplomat James Bulloch commissioned the building of the *Florida* and the *Alabama*, launching debate over Britain's supposed neutrality.⁶¹ Lord Wharncliffe's London and Confederate States Bank was a financial success.⁶² As the Union appeared to gain military momentum, the Confederacy launched Erlanger cotton bonds in London and Liverpool.⁶³ The bonds served a double purpose:⁶⁴ raising funds and fueling illicit British blockade running.⁶⁵ However, despite some financial and public support for the Confederacy, Parliamentary debate revealed powerful opposition to the South and cotton diplomacy.

BACKLASH: PRO-UNION PROPAGANDA AND THE BLOCKADE DEBATE

By March 1862, the South had attempted to gain recognition as a nation rather than just as a belligerent through Hotze's *Index*, Parliamentary support, and its own representatives.⁶⁶ As the Lancashire depression eased, the Confederacy initiated a new era of cotton diplomacy to

⁵⁷ 1814-1815 convention in which New England states threatened secession in response to America's entry into the War of 1812.

⁵⁸ James Spence, "The Constitutional Right of Secession," in *The American Union: Its Effect on National Character and Policy* (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1862), http://confederateprint.com/constitutional_right_secession.php (accessed December 28, 2010).

⁵⁹ Owsley, 191-192.

⁶⁰ Ironclad, commonly referred to as *Merrimack*.

⁶¹ Owsley, 420-436.

⁶² Sideman and Friedman, 191-192.

⁶³ "The Erlanger Cotton Loan," Nautical Archaeology at Texas A&M University, <http://nautarch.tamu.edu/PROJECTS?denbigh/erlanger.thm> (accessed Dec 20, 2010).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Owsley, 166-167.

deemphasize the Confederacy's self-embargo and to transfer British frustration toward the actions of the North.⁶⁷ The so-called Confederate Lobby in the House of Commons used the 1856 Declaration of Paris mandate that "blockades, in order to binding, must be effective"⁶⁸ to initiate Parliamentary debate on March 7, 1862, with speeches from William Gregory and William Lindsay,⁶⁹ over the legality of the Union blockade.⁷⁰ Lindsay asserted that the blockade failed to control travel from Southern ports.⁷¹ He also summoned Great Britain's history in struggles for freedom, such as the Greek war of liberation, to arouse sympathy for Confederate idealism.⁷² Despite nationalist pleas,⁷³ John Bright, William Forster, and Roundell Palmer responded with persuasive speeches that appealed to British self-interest.⁷⁴ Palmer called upon Britain to continue the policy of neutrality in effect since the beginning of the war⁷⁵ and argued that a relaxed interpretation of the Declaration of Paris would be advantageous to the British navy in future conflicts.⁷⁶ Britain "should do unto others as we would wish others to do to ourselves," he said.⁷⁷ Palmer spoke so persuasively that the House of Commons did not even vote on the issue as Confederate Lobby members rightly feared the consequences.⁷⁸ Confederate

⁶⁷ Charles M. Hubbard, "James Mason, The "Confederate Lobby" and the Blockade Debate of March 1862," *Civil War History* 45(1999), <http://www.questia.com> (accessed December 28, 2010).

⁶⁸ Yale Law School: The Avalon Project, "The Declaration of Paris April 16, 1856." http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/decparis.asp (accessed Dec 29, 2010).

⁶⁹ Hubbard, Charles M. *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy*. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1998), 77.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 66.

⁷¹ *London Times*, "House of Commons, Friday March 7," March 8, 1862, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 29, 2010).

⁷² Clement Eaton, *A History of the Southern Confederacy* (Simon and Schuster, 1965), Online, 77.

⁷³ Hubbard, "The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy," 77.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

⁷⁵ Roundell Palmer Selborne, "A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons: In the Debate on the North American Blockade" (speech), <http://books.google.com/ebooks> (accessed December 28, 2010).

⁷⁶ Hubbard, "The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy," 78.

⁷⁷ Palmer.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

sympathizer James Spence⁷⁹ viewed the relaxed interpretation as in Britain's best interest.⁸⁰ The *Times*, which had expressed pro-Southern sentiment in the past, claimed that "nobody can deny the colossal scale, the multifarious plan, and the exhaustive energy of [the blockade's] operations."⁸¹ The Confederates' inability to successfully manipulate the British debate, which coincided with Roanoke Island and Fort Donelson losses,⁸² foreshadowed the ultimate failure of cotton diplomacy.⁸³

OTHER LOST CHANCES

The 1861 *Trent* affair ushered in a period of debate and pro-Southern sentiment that the Confederacy failed to work to its advantage.⁸⁴ Northern Captain Charles Wilkes attacked John Slidell and John Mason, Confederates traveling on the British *Trent* on November 8, 1861.⁸⁵ The event launched hostile attitudes towards the North: the *London Morning Chronicle* warned America "to respect the flag of a mightier supremacy beyond the Atlantic."⁸⁶ Even after the Southern blunders in Parliament, Britain was still moderately hospitable to Southern diplomacy in 1862 as the Union army appeared weak.⁸⁷ Chancellor of the Exchequer William Gladstone⁸⁸ said in Newcastle on October 7, 1862, exactly five months after the blockade debate, that "there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis...[has] made an army; they are making, it appears a navy...and

⁷⁹ Refer to "Diplomacy and Propaganda" for more information on Spence.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ "House of Commons, Friday March 7," *London Times*, March 8, 1862, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 29, 2010).

⁸² Eaton, 77.

⁸³ Hubbard, "The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy," 80.

⁸⁴ Hubbard, 122.

⁸⁵ Sideman and Friedman, 91.

⁸⁶ "Abraham Lincoln," *London Morning Chronicle*, November 28, 1861, in *Europe Looks At the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 91.

⁸⁷ Hubbard, 114.

⁸⁸ Gladstone would later become prime minister four different times.

they have made a nation.”⁸⁹ Foreign minister John Russell⁹⁰ immediately condemned Gladstone for creating a deceiving impression that the Cabinet was leaning towards recognition.⁹¹ The South had another opportunity for British recognition when Napoleon III asked Britain on October 31, 1862 to formally support mediation with France and Russia.⁹² The Confederacy lost to strong opposition from Cornwall Lewis, who convinced the Cabinet that such action would violate neutrality.⁹³

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

In the spring of 1861, the British believed that the American Civil War lacked a moral component.⁹⁴ On September 22 1862, Lincoln changed this mindset with the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln had conceded in his Inaugural Address that he did not have the power to free the slaves,⁹⁵ but the Proclamation freed the slaves, as a measure of war, in Confederate territory.⁹⁶ The Proclamation forced the British to view the Confederate ideology differently.⁹⁷ With the South once the champions of liberty and revolutionary ideals, the Emancipation Proclamation renewed an ugly subject which Britain had internally eliminated in 1833: slavery.⁹⁸ The press attempted to undermine the Proclamation by questioning its intentions and

⁸⁹ William E. Gladstone, “Speech at Newcastle, October 7, 1862,” speech in *Europe Looks At the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 157.

⁹⁰ Russell was a former prime minister who would later return as prime minister.

⁹¹ John Russell to William E. Gladstone, quote in *Europe Looks At the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 158.

⁹² Hubbard, 121.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 121-123.

⁹⁴ Owsley, 206-209.

⁹⁵ Lincoln.

⁹⁶ Exec. Order No. 1, 3 C.F.R. (1863).

⁹⁷ Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, and Archer Jones, *Why the South the Civil War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 179.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

effectiveness, but could not stifle the working class's support for Lincoln.⁹⁹ The Manchester mill workers wrote Lincoln a congratulatory letter to him "and [his] country on this humane and righteous course," and even stated that "our interests, moreover, are identified with yours."¹⁰⁰ In effect, Lincoln had courted the British interests, which the South had failed to please. Ultimately, the Southern cotton culture raised a wall that Britain was unwilling to break. The Confederacy's reliance on slavery led to its downfall.¹⁰¹

THE FAILURE OF COTTON DIPLOMACY

In 1863, the Confederacy and Great Britain failed to reconcile their differences. The British consuls left their posts in the South, and the Confederate diplomats came home in defeat with little to show for their time. Great Britain never recognized the Confederacy as a nation, simply as a belligerent. *Richmond Enquirer* accused Great Britain to be "(next to the Yankees) our worst and deadliest enemy."¹⁰² At the beginning of the war, Britain questioned the motives and morality of Southern secession, and by the end, Britain could not face recognizing a nation that relied on slavery for labor. Between these resolutions, the Confederacy pursued a course of cotton diplomacy, which given British economic interests, appeared to stand a chance for success. However, the South's ability to produce cotton in fact encouraged its demise, as Britain's surplus at first undercut the need for Southern cotton. Then after the need arose again, the Confederacy, through self-embargo, increased destitution throughout Britain. Resilience and charity allowed the British workforce to survive without Confederate cotton. The Confederacy

⁹⁹ Adams, 102-111.

¹⁰⁰ Manchester Guardian to Abraham Lincoln, December 31, 1862, in *Europe Looks at the Civil War*, ed. Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New York: Collier Books, 1862), 167-168.

¹⁰¹ Hubbard, "The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy," 124.

¹⁰² *Richmond Enquirer*, April 1, 1863, quoted in Frank Lawrence Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 494.

underestimated the strength of the British workforce in morality, and the Emancipation Proclamation sealed the South's lost cause in Britain. On April 12, 1865, the Confederate States of America admitted defeat at Appomattox. Cotton and its culture had lost the war.

APPENDIX I¹⁰³

European Dependence on Southern Cotton

Table showing Southern exports to Great Britain and other areas of Europe from 1840-1859, as well as Great Britain's imports from other countries.

¹⁰³ "Facts in Relation to Cotton – Its Growth, Manufacture, and Influence on Commerce, Slavery, Emancipation, Etc., Chronologically Arranged." Chart, in *Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments VI: Slavery in the Light of Political Economy and Liberty and Slavery*, ed. E.N. Elliot (Augusta: Pritchard, Abbott, and Loomis, 1860), 253.

The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Hubris, Timing, and Economics Sunk King Cotton
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Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources

America's Civil War: Professor John C. Willis, "James Henry Hammond, Cotton is King, March 4, 1858," Sewanee University,

http://www.sewanee.edu/faculty/Willis/Civil_War/documents/HammondCotton.html

(accessed December 20, 2010).

Hammond emphasizes the Southern advantage over the North in foreign affairs in both economics and social structure. Hammond's speech reflects Southern hubris and strong conviction in their ability to conduct successful diplomacy abroad. I quoted Hammond's speech in my explanations of Southern overconfidence and cotton culture.

Arnold, Arthur Sir. *The History of the Cotton Famine from the Fall of Sumter to the Passing of the Public Works Act*. London: Saunders, Otley, and, 2009.

First published in 1864, this dissection of Southern failures is from a British perspective. This analysis of the cotton glut and famine provided helpful background and statistics.

Bragg, Henry. *The Daily News' Attack on the Index, and a Reader's Defence*. Liverpool: C. Tinling, 1865. Print.

Written after the conclusion of the Civil War as a response to criticism of Henry Hotze's *Index*, Bragg reiterates the South's desire to keep all aspects of cotton culture. This primary source boosted my understanding of the Southern mindset.

Editorial, "The Further Accounts," *London Times*, November 21, 1860, accessed December 26, 2010, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/>.

This editorial, written after Lincoln's election, shows the British attitude toward slavery. I used a quote from the editorial in my paragraph about British opposition to cotton culture.

Debow, J.D.B., ed., "Secession of the Cotton States," *Debow's Review* 30, no. 1 (January 1861): 95, University of Michigan: Humanities Text Initiative, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu> (accessed December 8, 2010).

The description of the Confederacy's economic and diplomatic power reflects Southern hubris. The attitude that Chase projects in his article, especially his prediction of foreign intervention, added to my understanding of the basis of cotton diplomacy.

Debow, J.D.B., ed. "India Cotton Competition Still a Failure." *Debow's Review* 26, no. 1 (January 1859): 85-86. University of Michigan: Humanities Text Initiative (accessed December 26, 2010).

This journal article describes the inferiority of Indian cotton. I used a quote from a British official in my paragraph on Southern economic power.

Christy, David, and Albert Taylor Bledsoe. *Cotton Is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments VI: Slavery in the Light of Political Economy and Liberty and Slavery*. Augusta, GA: Pritchard, Abbott & Loomis, 2006.

First published in 1860, this primary account of Southern life helped understand cotton culture. This background is necessary to understand the Southern perspective on economic and diplomatic policies. I used a quote from a chapter to contrast British and Southern attitudes toward slavery.

Debow, J.D.B., ed. "The Cotton Power." *Debow's Review* 26.1 (1859): 84-85. *University of Michigan: Humanities Text Initiative*. Web. 8 Dec. 2010. </acg1336.1-26.001>.

This article reflects prevailing attitudes in Southern society about the importance of cotton to the United States and world economy. This article is useful resource when explaining the economic perceptions of the South.

Exec. Order No. 1, 3 C.F.R. (1863).

Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation represented a turning point in cotton diplomacy and war aims. This document enhanced my paragraph on the Emancipation Proclamation's impact on British debates.

Hotze, Henry, and Lonnie A. Burnett. *Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist: Selected Writings on Revolution, Recognition, and Race*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 2008.

A collection of Hotze's writings, this book gives me first-hand opinions from Henry Hotze, the Confederate propagandist. It gave information for my paragraph on Confederate propaganda and the Index.

Hotze, Henry, and Richard Barksdale. Harwell. *Three Months in the Confederate Army*.

Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 2004.

Written by Henry Hotze, this diary conveys the opinions of the propagandist. It provided me with a Southern outlook on the war situation.

“House of Commons, Friday March 7,” *London Times*, March 8, 1862,

<http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive> (accessed December 29, 2010).

This report on the blockade debate described William Lindsay’s speech, as well as the *Times*’s commentary on the speech.

Lincoln, Abraham. "First Inaugural Address." Speech. <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html>

(accessed December 26, 2010).

Lincoln’s first inaugural address revealed his attitude toward the legality of emancipation. I described its foreign policy implications in my paragraph about the changing British mindset.

“No One Can Doubt the Full Sincerity,” November 14, 1862,

<http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 29, 2010).

The Sideman and Friedman book referred me to this article. I used a quote, which compared the Irish famine to the cotton famine, for this article.

Pollard, E.A. *The Lost Cause: The Standard Southern History of the War of the Confederates*.

Avenel, New Jersey: Gramercy, 1994.

Originally published in 1866, Pollard exemplifies the Southern mindset, and his analysis of the Southern loss will allow me to identify the problems of cotton diplomacy. Pollard's book was full of information on the Southern state of mind before and during the Civil War.

Russell, William H. *Civil War: Private Diary and Letters*. Ed. Martin Crawford. Athens:

University of Georgia, 1992.

As a writer for *London Times*, Russell's outlook gave me insight into British public opinion, as well as his view on America.

Russell, William Howard, and Eugene H. Berwanger. *My Diary North and South*. New York: Knopf, 1988.

Russell, a renowned writer for the *London Times*, shows the contrast between the North and the South. It provided an objective outlook on the different cultures.

Spence, James. "The Constitutional Right of Secession." In *The American Union: Its Effect on National Character and Policy*. London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1862.

http://confederatereprint.com/constitutional_right_secession.php (accessed December 28, 2010).

British, James Spence provides an explanation of secession's role in American history and the civil war. Spence's opinion as a proponent of states' rights was useful in my propaganda section.

Stringfellow, Thomas, and Chancellor Harper. *Cotton Is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments V2:*

The Bible Argument, In the Light of Social Ethics and in the Light of Ethnology. Augusta, GA: Pritchard, Abbott & Loomis, 2007.

A reproduction of the 1860 version, this primary source defends Southern cotton culture, especially slavery. This view of society supplied information for my paragraph on Southern society.

"The Lancashire Manufacturers," *London Times*, January 24, 1861,

<http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive> (accessed December 27, 2010).

This *Times* article laments the impending economic troubles in Lancashire and questions Britain's dependence on the Confederacy. I used a quote from this article in my "Embargoes" section.

"There Is a Cry for Cotton," June 1, 1861, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 27, 2010).

I used a quote from this article to convey Britain's unhealthy dependence on Southern cotton.

"The Success of the Cotton States: Its Status, Its Advantages, Its Power." *DeBow's Review* [New Orleans] Jan. 1861: 94.

This article from Debow's Review gave me an understanding of the Southern overconfidence and faith in cotton in diplomacy.

"The Supply of Cotton," *London Times*, January 23, 1861,

<http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/> (accessed December 26, 2010).

Printed during the period of secessions, this article predicts the economic troubles and future cotton shortage in Britain. The *Times* criticizes Britain's inability to foresee these economic problems earlier. I used a quote from this article in my first paragraph about economics.

Yale Law School: The Avalon Project, "The Declaration of Paris April 16, 1856."

http://avalon.yale.edu/19th_century/decparis.asp (accessed December 29, 2010).

The text of the Declaration of Paris allowed me to understand the secondary analyses of the blockade debate. The text provided a background to international blockade rules.

Secondary Sources

Adams, Ephraim Douglass. *Great Britain and the American Civil War*. New York: Longmans, Green, 1925.

A history of Britain's involvement in the American Civil War, Adams's book details the economic crisis in the English markets and how British public opinion was affected by this crisis. Adams's reference to primary sources also helped me determine where to look for primary opinions.

Beringer, Richard E., Herman Hattaway, and Archer Jones. *Why the South Lost the Civil War*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986.

This book provided me with information on the Emancipation Proclamation's foreign policy implications.

Berwanger, Eugene H. *The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 1994.

Chronicling the behavior of British consuls during the Civil War, Berwanger's work will provide analysis of viewpoints of British diplomats in America. This analysis allowed me to assess the changing attitudes of the British government towards the Civil War.

Blackett, R.J.M. *Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2001.

With an analysis of the nationalism, economic history, and moral inclinations of British and American peoples, Blackett captured the debate of intervention in Britain. This was useful in my paragraphs about pro-Southern and anti-Southern sentiment in Britain.

Cullop, Charles P. *Confederate Propaganda in Europe, 1861-1865*. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1969. Print.

Detailing the efforts of the Confederacy to gain approval in Britain, Cullop's book provided me with a look into the Southern mindset. His descriptions of the *Index* prove useful in my paragraphs about Henry Hotze.

Eaton, Clement. *A History of the Southern Confederacy*. Simon and Schuster, 1965. Online.

Eaton's book was a valuable resource in the sections about the blockade debate.

Harris, Thomas L. *The Trent Affair: A Review of English and American Relations at the Beginning of the Civil War*. Indianapolis: Bowen-Merrill, 1896. Print.

Focusing on the Trent Affair as a pivotal event in American-British foreign policy, Harris's description of English sympathies before and after the event provided me with a framework for my paragraph on the British mindset. The elaboration on the Queen's Neutrality Proclamation also enhanced my understanding of official British policy.

Hubbard, Charles M. *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1998.

Hubbard details the outlook of Jefferson Davis. His description of Davis's lack of research on key matters provided me with reasons why cotton diplomacy failed. Hubbard's description of the blockade debate was also useful.

Hubbard, Charles M. "James Mason, The "Confederate Lobby" and the Blockade Debate of March 1862." *Civil War History* 45 (1999). Accessed December 28, 2010.
<http://www.questia.com>.

Hubbard's article supplemented his description of the blockade in *The Burden of Cotton Diplomacy*. It was a useful resource in the section about Parliament's blockade debate.

Hyman, Harold Melvin, and H. C. Allen. *Heard round the World; the Impact Abroad of the Civil War*. New York: Knopf, 1969.

The chapter on Great Britain and America boosted my knowledge of Great Britain's stake in America. The quotes from this chapter were a valuable resource in my paragraph about the British mindset.

Jordan, Donaldson, and Edwin J. Pratt. *Europe and the American Civil War*. Cambridge: Riverside, 1931.

This book covers the opinion and political tact of British Parliament members and public figures during the Civil War. As this book contains footnotes for several quotes, it gave me a list of primary sources to search for.

The American Civil War Home Page. 2010. <http://www.civilwarhome.com/kingcotton.htm>
(accessed December 20, 2010).

With a comprehensive overview of cotton before and during the Civil War, this website provided me with information on the self-embargo and blockade. This website also provided valuable information on the Trent affair.

Owsley, Frank Lawrence. *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1931.

Owsley's book provided me with an invaluable overview of the social and economic status of the cotton industry in the South, as well as statistics that reveal the dependency of England on the South. The book provides the framework necessary to understand larger concepts.

Selborne, Roundell Palmer. "A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons: In the Debate on the North American Blockade." Speech. Accessed December 28, 2010.

<http://books.google.com/ebooks>.

Palmer's speech provided an anti-interventionist outlook during the blockade debate. This primary source was helpful in the blockade debate section.

Sideman, Belle Becker, and Lillian Friedman. *Europe Looks at the Civil War, an Anthology*. New York: Orion, 1960.

A compilation of documents, letters, newspaper articles, speeches and diary entries, Sideman and Friedman's anthology provided me with resources to determine the prevailing attitudes in England and the rest of Europe before, during, and after the Civil War. These documents provided supplemental information for paragraphs about British mindset, the foundation of cotton diplomacy, debates, and the analysis of its failure.

Sword, Wiley. *Southern Invincibility: A History of the Confederate Heart*. New York: St.

Martin's, 1999.

Sword's depiction of the Southern attitudes towards agriculture, their commercial power, and secession helped develop my understanding of Southern cotton culture. This resource provides quotes and references to primary sources that helped my paragraphs on cotton culture and the formation of cotton diplomacy.

"The Erlanger Cotton Loan." Nautical Archaeology at Texas A&M University. Accessed December 20, 2010. <http://nautarch.tamu.edu/PROJECTS/denbigh/erlanger.htm>.

An overview of the Erlanger cotton loan, this website enriched my understanding of Confederate successes during the Civil War.

Warren, Gordon H. *Fountain of Discontent: the Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas*. Boston:

Northeastern UP, 1981.

Through an explanation of the conditions before, during, and after the Trent Affair, Warren illustrates the tensions between the British and Union governments. This information was useful for my paragraph on general American-British attitudes.