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The Siege of Petersburg

By the end of May 1864, the Confederate and Union armies in the areas surrounding Petersburg, Virginia were facing the same problem: battle fatigue. They needed relief from the constant fighting. When both armies finally decided to entrench themselves, it was for reasons other than just fatigue. Facing superior numbers, the Confederate troops dug in to protect themselves against Union assaults. The Union Army entrenched itself to prepare for an assault.

After weeks of digging, both sides had accumulated a large number of trenches. Elaborate systems of trenches with redans were placed in front with a second set of trenches to the rear. Sunken roads protected from enemy fire connected the rear trenches. The Union’s use of rifled siege guns and mortars soon shattered peaceful weeks of digging. The Confederates responded with their own shelling. The trenches had become a place of fear and death.

After the fighting on June 18, the 48th Pennsylvania found itself in a unique position. Occupying the closest position to the enemy, it dug in. In that trench, a plan was conceived that would alter the course of the battle over Petersburg. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasant, commander of the 48th, concluded that his troops, most of whom were miners before the war, could mine under the redan across from their position and blow it up. After suggesting the idea to his commander, Pleasant presented the plan to Major General Ambrose Burnside, commander of IX Corps. Believing that he could obtain approval for the plan from headquarters, Burnside gave approval for the digging to start. Unfortunately, the response from Major General George S. Meade and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant was less than enthusiastic. Allowing the digging to continue because it occupied the men’s time, both generals wanted to investigate the plan more fully.

Upon further study, Meade’s staff concluded that the idea would not work. Because “such a length of mine had never been excavated in military operations,” Meade’s engineers believed the plan impossible. Even if Pleasant’s miners were able to dig the tunnel, the plan did not elaborate how well-fortified Confederate positions beyond Elliott’s Redan, the intended target of the mine, would be assaulted after the mine’s explosion.

On July 17, the 48th Pennsylvania had completed the main gallery of the mine. Overcoming his initial response to the mine, Grant now wanted to incorporate it into an assault or a diversion. Eventually, Grant devised a plan to employ the mine as a diversion for a larger operation north of the James River. By going on the offense, Grant hoped to force Confederate General Robert E. Lee to send troops away from Petersburg to protect Richmond. Burnside was given the task of implementing the plan to use the mine as a means of assault.

Burnside’s plan called for the participation of Brigadier General Edward Ferrero’s African American troops. Exploding the mine with 12,000 pounds of powder, the plan called for two brigades of African American troops to attack-- one going down the right flank and the other going down the left flank. Simultaneously, the rest of Ferrero’s division would direct itself towards the area to the rear of Elliott’s Redan, which included Cemetery Hill.

Prompted by his personal dislike of Burnside, Meade immediately began altering Burnside’s battle plan. Only 8,000 pounds of powder were supplied to explode the mine. Also, short lengths of low-quality blasting fuse were supplied. The day before the attack, Meade overruled the use of Burnside’s African American troops to lead the attack. He stated two reasons for his decision. First, he believed the troops were too inexperienced. Second, he believed that if the assault failed, it would appear that they had sacrificed the African American troops. Meade then ordered that there were to be no flank movements, but a direct attack towards the area behind Elliott’s Redan.

Burnside was devastated to learn that his plan was not going to be implemented. Incapable of improvisation, Burnside was unable to make a decision on which of his division commanders should lead the assault. Finally, Brigadier Generals James H. Ledlie, Robert B. Potter, and Orlando B. Willcox drew straws to decide who would lead.

Siege of Petersburg: the 5th Corps awaiting Orders to Advance. From Frank Leslie's Illustrated Leaders and Battles of the Civil War, p. 495.

Ledlie was given the assignment. A worst choice could not have been made. Ledlie had a reputation as an incompetent field commander, as well as being a drunk.

On July 30, at 3:15 a.m., Colonel Pleasant entered the tunnel and lit the fuses. The mine was expected to blow fifteen minutes later. An hour later, the mine had still not exploded. Two volunteers entered the tunnel and found that the fuse had gone out at a splice. The fuse was re-ignited. Finally, at 4:44, the mine exploded.

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